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ABSTRACT: In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the pos-
session conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue 
that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present 
perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, there-
fore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession condi-
tions of these concepts. Second, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then 
Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given.
Keywords: Peacocke; concept possession; scenario contents; protopropositions; the Myth of the Given.
RESUMEN: En “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke presenta un argumento a favor del no-conceptualismo derivado de las 
condiciones de posesión de los conceptos observacionales. En este trabajo, planteo dos objeciones a este argu-
mento. Primero, sostengo que si los contenidos perceptivos son contenidos de escenario, entonces las experien-
cias perceptivas no pueden representar las circunstancias especificadas por las condiciones de aplicación de los 
conceptos observacionales y, por lo tanto, no pueden desempeñar los roles semánticos y epistémicos que Pea-
cocke quiere que jueguen en el condiciones de posesión de estos conceptos. En segundo lugar, sostengo que si 
los contenidos perceptivos son protoproposiciones, entonces la explicación de Peacocke acerca de las condicio-
nes de posesión de los conceptos observacionales cae en el mito de lo dado.
Palabras clave: Peacocke; posesión de conceptos; contenidos de escenario; protoproposiciones; el mito de lo dado.
1. Introduction
In “Study of Concepts” (1992a) and subsequent works (1992b, 1998, 2001), Christopher 
Peacocke advances a non-conceptualist view of perception. One of the main arguments 
Peacocke puts forward to make his case derives from the possession conditions of obser-
vational concepts. According to Peacocke, the possession of observational concepts—i.e., 
concepts the application of which is based on observations—does necessarily rest on the ex-
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ercise of perceptual discriminatory capacities. However, the exercise of perceptual discrimi-
natory capacities cannot rest, in turn, on the possession of conceptual abilities, on pain of 
circularity. For, if perceptual capacities were conceptual, then exercising these capacities 
would depend on possessing observational concepts, which, in turn, would depend on ex-
ercising perceptual discriminatory capacities, in a vicious circle. Therefore—Peacocke con-
cludes—perceptual discriminations must be non-conceptual.
Much has been written about the nature of observational concepts and their relation-
ship to perception. Empiricists were the first philosophers who explicitly took the acquisi-
tion and possession of observational concepts (“simple ideas” in Locke’s vocabulary) to de-
pend on perceptual capacities. After the linguistic turn, logical empiricists tried to explain 
the semantic content of observational predicates (such as “red”) through semantic rules 
that tie the application of these predicates to non-conceptual states of perceptual awareness 
(Ayer 1954). Currently, no philosopher denies that there must be a close relationship be-
tween observational concepts and perceptual discriminatory capacities. Recent discussions, 
however, have mainly focused on what kind of relationship this is. Some philosophers have 
denied that the relationship that ties observational concepts to perceptual capacities is se-
mantic and epistemic, leaving the role perception plays in the possession condition of ob-
servational concepts to be merely causal (Brandom 2002, 2010; Davidson 1982, 1983). 
Others philosophers, including McDowell (1994, 2009), Peacocke (1992a, 1998), and Ber-
múdez (1997, 2003, 2007), have argued, in contrast, that the relationship between observa-
tional concepts and perception is both semantic and epistemic.12Thus, assuming that this 
relationship is so, McDowell, on the one hand, and Peacocke and Bermúdez, on the other, 
have disputed about the very nature of perceptual capacities. According to McDowell, per-
ceptual capacities must be fully conceptual, for otherwise, an episode of the Myth of the 
1 By “semantic and epistemic”, I mean that the relationship between the possession of observational 
concepts and perceptual experiences is not that of mere causal dependence of the former on the latter, 
but of semantic dependence of the content of observational concepts on the content of perceptual ex-
periences and, thus, of epistemic dependence of the application of observational concepts in beliefs and 
judgments on the content of perceptual experiences. In Peacocke’s terms, “concepts are constituents 
of complete contents which are evaluable as true or as false. A concept, if necessary with some contri-
bution from the world, fixes a semantic value. If a concept is individuated by its possession condition, 
that condition must equally fix a semantic value” (Peacocke 1999, 335). My point is that, insofar as the 
possession of observational concepts depends on perceptual discriminatory capacities, perceptual dis-
criminations fix the semantic content (and, consequently, they provide knowledge of the application 
conditions) of observational concepts on which the truth-conditions of perceptual beliefs and judg-
ments rest. In this respect, I mean that the role perceptual experiences play in the possession condi-
tions of observational concepts is semantic and epistemic rather than merely causal. Someone might 
suggest that Peacocke is actually for a causal rather than a constitutive explanation of concept posses-
sion. According to this interpretation, to provide the possession conditions of observational concepts 
is to provide the perceptual inputs that cause someone to possess such concepts. However, if this were 
the case, then contentless perceptual episodes à la Davidson (1983) would perfectly play that part. Al-
though there is certain ambiguity in Peacocke’s theory, he is clear that what is relevant for the posses-
sion condition of observational concepts are not perceptual states but their content. For Peacocke, per-
ceptual inputs not only cause someone to possess observational concept; the content of these episodes 
fixes the content of observational concepts and, for this reason, they provide reasons to subjects for ap-
plying them in thought and beliefs. I will expand this point in the next section. 
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Given would obtain (McDowell 1994, 1998, 2009). According to Peacocke and Bermúdez, 
in contrast, perceptual capacities must be non-conceptual, for otherwise, a circular explana-
tion would obtain (Bermúdez 2007; Peacocke 1992a, 1998).
In this paper, I will not get into the debate between Peacocke, Bermúdez, and 
M cDowell on the nature of perceptual capacities. I am not going to argue in favor of ei-
ther McDowell’s conceptualism or Peacocke’s and Bermúdez’s non-conceptualism. What 
I want to focus on here is the problem that follows from holding Peacocke’s explanatory 
model of the possession conditions of observational concepts.2 My strategy will be Sellar-
sian. In effect, like McDowell (1998), I will argue that Peacocke’s explanation of the pos-
session condition of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given. However, 
unlike McDowell, I will offer a much more powerful interpretation of the Myth of the Giv-
en.3 In my view, Sellars’s Myth of the Given is not just the thesis according to which non-
conceptual mental states cannot be reasons insofar as they lack—as McDowell holds (1994, 
2009)—the structure required to participate in reasoning. The Myth of the Given, I argue, 
is an illusory or mythical explanation where, in order to explain the possession conditions 
—and, thus, the semantic and epistemic properties—of observational concepts, another 
phenomenon is brought into play—namely, perceptual discriminations—which, in turn, is 
taken to have the same properties to be explained (the semantic and epistemic properties of 
observational concepts); and where, in order to avoid circularity (i.e., that the semantic and 
epistemic properties of perceptual discriminations derive from observational concepts), 
these properties are taken to be given in perception (they are self-explanatory).4
2 The same objection might be raised against Bermúdez’s non-conceptualism insofar as Bermúdez ex-
plicitly follows Peacocke in that the acquisition and possession of observational concepts cognitively 
depend on non-conceptual perceptual discriminations (Bermúdez 2007).
3 This paper does not aim at being exegetical in that it does not provide Sellars’s textual evidence to sup-
port the interpretation of the Myth of the Given I offer here. In (2014) I already advanced substantive 
arguments for such an interpretation. In footnote 7, however, I introduce some Sellars’s remarks that 
go in this direction. 
4 It is worth noting that Peacocke is explicitly against circularity (see 1992, ch. 1 and 1998, 387-388). 
According to Peacocke, to possess an observational concept, say “red”, is to be able to correctly apply 
this concept in different thoughts and beliefs based on perceptual discriminations of red stuff. Pea-
cocke argues that exercising perceptual discriminations of red stuff cannot involve the possession of 
the concept “red”, since, otherwise, perceptually representing a red object would depend on applying 
the concept “red”, an activity that, due to the possession condition of this concept, should be based on 
either a different perceptual mental state about red stuff, in an infinite regress, or in thoughts involv-
ing the concept “red”, in a vicious circle. Both McDowell (1998) and Brewer (2005) have argued that 
circularity poses no problem to them, as they are for a constitutive (or transcendental) explanation of 
concept possession where it is usual that the explanans and explanandum share certain properties. In 
(2014), I have extensively argued against this transcendental move. In particular, I argued that, if one 
accepts McDowell’s and Brewer’s points of view, then either perceivers apply observational concepts 
in perception based on previous conceptual mental states, which makes perceptual experiences identi-
cal to Davidson’s perceptual beliefs—in other words, McDowell’s minimal empiricism collapses—or 
perceivers do not apply observational concepts in perception but they are just invited to do so—in 
M cDowell’s terms, conceptual capacities are passive in perception—which makes perceptual experi-
ences unable to play the role McDowell and Brewer want them to play in empirical thinking. For the 
sake of argument, in this paper I will leave aside the debate between McDowell, Brewer, and Peacocke 
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The paper breaks into two sections. In the first section, I briefly present Peacocke’s 
two-level account of non-conceptual perceptual content: scenario contents and protoprop-
ositions. Then, I reconstruct Peacocke’s main argument for non-conceptualism derived 
from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In the second section, I raise an 
objection to Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts. To 
do so, I follow a two-step strategy. Firstly, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual con-
tents are understood in terms of scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot 
present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of obser-
vational concepts—i.e., the circumstances which must obtain for a concept P to be applied 
correctly—and,5 consequently, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke 
wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. Secondly, I argue that if 
non-conceptual perceptual contents are understood in terms of protopropositions, then 
Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the 
Myth of the Given. In the end, we will see that Peacocke non-conceptualism is a dead-end.
2. Non-conceptualism and observational concepts
In “Study of Concepts” (1992a), Peacocke defends a non-conceptualist view of percep-
tion. According to Peacocke, perceptual non-conceptual contents are of two types: sce-
narios and protopropositions. A scenario content is a non-propositional, non-conceptual 
content that presents the subject with her environment in a spatial way. For example, if I 
open my eyes right now, my visual experience informs me that there is a laptop in front of 
me, that the laptop is sitting on a library table, that there is a cup of coffee right by the lap-
top, that the cup of coffee is white, etc. A scenario content is a type of egocentric spatial 
representation where surfaces and their properties (features) are located around the per-
ceiving subject. In other words, a scenario content is a way of filling out the space around 
the perceiver (1992a, 61). To specify a scenario content, we have to fix an origin—nor-
mally in the perceiver’s chest—and axes—normally drawn from body directions such as 
right/left, up/down, front/back of the perceiver—and to specify a way of filling out the 
space around this origin—normally by determining whether there is a surface with some 
properties (e.g., solidity, texture, saturation, brightness, hue) for each point identified 
along the axes. Of course, perceptual experiences with a scenario content have correctness 
conditions. A perceptual experience is correct if and only if the scenario content matches 
the perceiver’s immediate environment, that is, if real objects (with their properties) are 
on circularity. What is important here is that, for Peacocke, circularity is a real problem that any the-
ory of concept possession should avoid. In the rest of the paper, I will show that, due to his constraint 
on circularity, Peacocke ends up attributing to perceptual discriminations the properties characteristic 
of conceptual moves, but without recognizing them as truly conceptual, which is what I take to be Sell-
ars’s Myth of the Given. 
5 By “application conditions”, I refer to the conditions that must obtain for a concept P to be applied 
correctly. These conditions are the truth-conditions of propositional contents containing the very 
concept P. For example, the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept “red” 
are those where objects are red. These circumstances are, in turn, the truth-conditions of propositional 
contents involving the content “red”. 
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located in the space around the perceiver in the way that is specified by the scenario con-
tent. Peacocke calls the way objects and their properties are actually located in the per-
ceiver immediate environment a scene. Thus, according to Peacocke, a scenario content is 
correct if and only if the scene falls under the spatial type specified by the scenario content 
(1992a, 64).
Now, it might be possible that two perceivers, or even the same perceiver on differ-
ent occasions, perceive the same spatial type but a different content. Suppose, for example, 
that when I perceive the floor tiles of my bathroom, I perceive them as diamonds. Suppose, 
however, that when my wife perceives the same floor tiles, from the very same angle, she 
perceives them as squares. Clearly, scenario contents cannot help us account for the differ-
ence in content between my wife’s visual experience and mine. After all, specifying an ori-
gin, axes, and way of filling out the space around this origin fails to capture the fineness of 
grain (aspectuality) involved in my wife’s and my visual experiences. Peacocke introduces 
protopropositions to account for such cases. When I perceive the floor tiles as diamonds—
Peacocke argues—my visual experience conveys the protoproposition that the figures are 
symmetrical about the bisectors of their angles. When my wife perceives the floor tiles as 
squares, her visual experience conveys the protoproposition that the figures are symmetrical 
about the bisector of their sides. Protopropositions contain individuals (particular objects), 
spatial properties, and relations, rather than concepts thereof (1992a, 72). As a result, pro-
topropositional contents represent spatial properties or relations themselves as holding of 
the individuals they also contain (1992a, 77). As such, they have a subject-predicate struc-
ture. However, they are—according to Peacocke—non-conceptual. When a subject per-
ceives a surface as a square instead of as a diamond, what she perceives is that certain spatial 
property, say the symmetry about the bisectors of its sides, holds of the surface. Accord-
ingly, the difference between perceiving a surface as a square and perceiving it as a diamond 
is a matter of which symmetries of the surface are perceived. The perceiver, of course, “does 
not need to know that this is the nature of the difference” (Peacocke 1998, 381). Moreover, 
she need not possess the concepts of “symmetry”, “surface”, and “side”, in order to enjoy a 
visual experience conveying the protoproposition that the surface is symmetrical about the 
bisector of its sides. All she needs is just to perceive such a symmetrical relation itself. Thus, 
although protopropositions have the subject-predicate structure, which is characteristic of 
conceptual contents, they are essentially non-conceptual.
One of the main reasons Peacocke puts forward a non-conceptualist view of percep-
tions is to explain the individuation, acquisition, and possession of observational concepts 
(Peacocke 1992a, 108). According to Peacocke, it is essential for concepts to play a role in 
thoughts or propositional attitudes. Concept possession, then, is defined as the capacity of 
thinkers to form propositional thoughts by applying those concepts (1992a, 5). Now, ob-
servational concepts are concepts the application of which is based on observations. Color 
and shape concepts are typical examples of observational concepts. Thus, the possession 
of observational concepts may well be defined as the capacity of thinkers to form propo-
sitional thoughts containing concepts the application of which is based on perceptual dis-
criminations. According to Peacocke, an accurate explanation of concept possession must 
avoid circularity, that is, the explanation must not presuppose that the thinker already pos-
sesses the concepts the possession of which is sought to be explained (1992a, 116). Since 
the possession conditions of observational concepts involve perceptual discriminatory ca-
pacities, perceptual discriminatory capacities—Peacocke argues—must be non-conceptual. 
406 Federico Castellano
Theoria 33/3 (2018): 401-416
Otherwise, exercising perceptual discriminatory capacities would depend on possessing 
observational concepts, which, in turn, would depend on exercising perceptual discrimi-
natory capacities, in a vicious circle. For example, an account of the possession conditions 
of the concept “red” must not presuppose that, in order to perceptually discriminate red 
stuff, the subject already possess the concept “red”. After all, for a subject S to possess the 
concept “red” is—according to Peacocke—for S to be (feel) primitively compelled to apply 
the concept “red” in present-tense demonstrative thoughts such as “this is red” whenever 
S perceives the circumstances specified by the application conditions of this concept—i.e., 
whenever she perceptually discriminates red objects (1992a, 117).
It is not surprising that Peacocke explicitly commits himself to perceptual reasons. In-
sofar as perceptual experiences are contentful mental states on which the possession of ob-
servational concepts rests, perception provides compelling reasons for forming beliefs in-
volving those concepts. Quoting Peacocke, “experiences give a thinker who possesses the 
relatively observational concept square not merely reasons but good reasons for forming 
the belief that the demonstratively presented object is square” (1992a, 80). What is be-
hind Peacocke’s claim is that, since perceptual beliefs and judgments are made of observa-
tional concepts, and observational concepts are, in turn, concepts the application of which 
is based on perceptual discriminations, when perceptual discriminations—which are non-
conceptual representational mental states—are correct, they provide thinkers with good 
reasons for applying the correct observational concepts and, consequently, for forming 
true beliefs involving those concepts. In Peacocke’s terms, “that they are good reasons is 
intimately related to the condition required for the belief ‘That’s square’ to be true. If the 
thinker’s perceptual systems are functioning properly, so that the non-conceptual repre-
sentational content of his experience is correct, then when such experiences occur, the ob-
ject thought about will really be square” (Peacocke 1992a, 80). This is an empiricist the-
sis with which many defenders of non-conceptualist agree (Heck 2000; Peacocke 1992b; 
Bermúdez 2007; Hanna 2011). Indeed, Empiricism is the view that empirical knowledge 
derives from sense experience. Peacocke’s non-conceptualism is a sophisticated form of 
Empiricism in that, when a non-conceptual perceptual experience, say of a square surface, 
is correct, it presents perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application con-
ditions of the concept “square” (i.e., with square surfaces) and, consequently, it provides 
them with good reasons for believing that the surface is square.6 I will return to this point 
soon.
6 In (Castellano 2014), I argued for a semantic interpretation of Empiricism. In my view, Empiricism 
is the philosophical view that the content of empirical thoughts (thoughts about the empirical world) 
derived from the content of perceptual experiences. Differences aside, I claim that both McDowell’s 
conceptualism and Peacocke’s non-conceptualism share the same empiricist-semantic background in 
that they both want the content of observational concepts—and consequently the content of empiri-
cal thoughts—to cognitively depends on the content of perceptual experiences. In (Castellano 2014), 
I argued that, because of avoiding the Myth of the Given, McDowell’s conceptualism falls into a non-
virtuous circularity. In this paper, I argue that, because of avoiding circularity, Peacocke’s non-concep-
tualism faces the opposite problem: the Myth of the Given. 
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3. Concept possession and the myth of the given
Sellars’s Myth of the Given (1956) is often construed as holding that no mental state can be 
both non-conceptual and the sort of cognitive episode that might serve as a reason for hold-
ing beliefs. Hence, it has been concluded—somewhat hastily, I believe—that non-concep-
tual approaches to perceptual experience fall into the Myth of the Given (McDowell 1994, 
1998, 2009). However, Sellars’s critique of the Given is originally concerned with the sense 
data theory and the foundation of empirical knowledge. As Sellars himself admitted, the 
Given “is a piece of epistemological shoptalk” (Sellars 1956, 13). Non-conceptualism, on 
the other hand, is the view that the representational content of perceptual experiences is, 
unlike those of beliefs and judgments, partially or entirely non-conceptual. Non-conceptu-
alism, broadly speaking, is a content rather than an epistemic view. Thus, it is far from clear 
to what extent non-conceptualism falls into the Myth of the Given.
Now, McDowell is famous for his strong rejection of non-conceptualism. According 
to McDowell, non-conceptualist views of perception cannot help but fall into the Myth 
of the Given (McDowell 1994, 1998, 2009). I believe McDowell is right to a certain ex-
tent. Nevertheless, his conclusion derives from an interpretation of the Myth of the Given 
which, to my mind, is weak. In effect, McDowell usually refers to “the Given” as episodes 
of awareness that do not involve conceptual capacities. However, when he is asked to elu-
cidate the reasons why such episodes might pose a problem to non-conceptualists, he is not 
so clear. More often than not, McDowell argues that episodes of perceptual non-concep-
tual awareness cannot be reasons for beliefs and judgments insofar as (i) they lack concep-
tual structure, and (ii) only conceptually structured episodes of awareness have the logical 
or inferential properties required to play a role as premises in reasoning (McDowell 1994, 
1998, 2009). Many non-conceptualists, however, have rejected (ii) by arguing that reasons 
are not to be confined to conceptually structured mental states (Hanna 2011; Heck 2000; 
Peacocke 1998). In what follows, I will argue—like McDowell—that Peacocke’s account of 
the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given. But, 
unlike McDowell, I will do so by bringing into play a different interpretation of Sellars’s 
Myth of the Given. In my view, the Myth of the Given is an illusory explanation where, on 
the one hand, perceptual discriminations are introduced to explain the semantic and epis-
temic properties of observational concepts, but on the other hand, perceptual discrimina-
tions end up having the very same semantic and epistemic properties that observational 
concepts are thought to possess; and where in order not to fall into a vicious circle (i.e., the 
semantic and epistemic properties of perceptual discriminations ultimately derive from 
conceptual moves), these properties are taken to be given in the perception. But let us not 
waste more time and get straight to the heart of the matter.
It follows from Peacocke’s assumptions that representing facts of the form “s is red” in 
conceptual thinking—where “red” is an observational concept—depends on non-concep-
tually representing red stuff in perception. After all, Peacocke is for the view that the pos-
session of observational concepts such as “red” depends on being able to discriminate red 
stuff in perception, and to perceptually discriminate red stuff is, in turn, to non-conceptu-
ally represent red stuff in perception. It is worth noting that, insofar representing facts of 
the form “s is red” in conceptual thinking involves non-conceptually representing red stuff 
in perception, circularity disappears. For, on this view, the ability to correctly apply the ob-
servational concept “red” in order to form empirical thoughts depends on an ability which, 
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in turn, does not depend, to be exercised, on the application of the concept “red”. However, 
another problem arises. For, if perceiving is a matter of representing the perceiver’s imme-
diate environments non-conceptually, then perceiving red stuff either does not involve an 
awareness of objects as being red and, consequently, does not present perceivers with the 
circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concepts “red”, or does involve 
an awareness of objects as being red, rendering the explanation a myth. Let me expand this 
point.
Peacocke argues that the possession of observational concepts such as “red”—and con-
sequently, the ability to think (believe, judge) facts such as “s is red”—depends on non-con-
ceptually representing red stuff in perception. However, non-conceptually representing red 
stuff in perception may be interpreted, following Peacocke, in two different ways:
1. Non-conceptually representing red stuff in perception is a matter of representing 
surfaces and instances of the property RED as occupying the same region (point) 
in an egocentric spatial representation.
2. Non-conceptually representing red stuff in perception is representing the property 
RED itself as holding of places, lines, or regions in an egocentric spatial representa-
tion, or of objects perceived as located in such places (Peacocke 1992a, 77).
Thus, based on the distinction drawn above, we may legitimately ask now: can non-concep-
tual perceptual states in (1) and (2) play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants 
them to play in the possession conditions of the concept “red”? In what follows, I will argue 
that neither (1) nor (2) can do so. To make my case, I will proceed by analyzing (1) and (2) 
respectively.
3.1. Scenario contents
If perceiving red stuff is a matter of representing surfaces and instances of redness as oc-
cupying the same regions in an egocentric space, then—as Sellars has taught us— perceiv-
ing red stuff is not a form of perceptual knowledge (Sellars 1956, 16). For, being percep-
tually aware of particulars, say of objects and instances of properties, does not amount to 
perceptually representing those objects as having the properties the instantiation of which 
one is perceptually aware of. In other words, perceptually representing a surface and a par-
ticular instantiation of redness as occupying the same region in an egocentric space does 
not amount to representing that particular surface as having the general property of being 
red. Co-instantiation—we may say—is not predication. But if perceiving is not a form of 
knowledge in the sense described above—that is, if perceiving does not involve any kind of 
predication—then perception cannot be the kind of mental state upon which the applica-
tion of observational concepts may be based. Let me show why.
We know that observational concepts are those the content of which expresses, when 
correctly applied, perceptual knowledge of the form “s is red”. Thus, in order to conceptu-
ally represent facts such as “s is red”—that is, that “red” is the appropriate concept to apply 
to s on a particular occasion—one must perceptually discriminate the circumstances speci-
fied by the application conditions of the concept “red”. However, the circumstances speci-
fied by the application conditions of the concept “red” are precisely those where objects are 
red (i.e., objects as having the property RED). Hence, in order to represent facts such as “s 
is red” in conceptual thinking, one must perceptually discriminate s as being red—in other 
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words, one must perceptually represent s as being red. But representing red scenario con-
tents does not amount to perceptually representing objects as being red. Co-instantiation, 
we have seen, is not predication. Therefore, perception cannot present us with the circum-
stances specified by the application conditions of the concept red obtain. Since perception 
cannot present us with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the 
concept red, perception cannot be the basis on which the possession of observational con-
cepts rests.
To make my point clearer, I will put it in terms of a deductive argument:
(P1) Representing facts of the form “s is red” in conceptual thinking is an ability the 
exercising of which rests on applying the concept “red” correctly.
(P2) Correctly applying the concept “red” depends, in turn, on perceptually discrimi-
nating the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept 
“red”.
(P3) The circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept “red” 
are those where objects are red.
(P4) Perceiving red objects is a matter of representing red objects non-conceptually.
(P5) Representing red objects non-conceptually is, in turn, a matter of being percep-
tually aware of (representing) surfaces and instances of RED.
(P6) However, being perceptually aware of (representing) surfaces and instances of 
RED does not amount to perceiving those objects as having the property RED 
(co-instantiation is not predication).
(P7) Therefore, non-conceptually perceiving red objects does not amount to perceiv-
ing the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept 
“red”.
(C1) Non-conceptually perceiving red objects cannot be the basis on which represent-
ing facts of the form “s is red” in conceptual thinking rests.
(P1) is an intuitive thesis to which Peacocke is explicitly committed. (P2) is the well-known 
empiricist thesis according to which the application of observational concepts depends on 
perceptually discriminating the circumstances specified by the application conditions of 
such concepts, and to which Peacocke, as we have seen, is committed as well. (P3) is as in-
tuitive as the first in that it just describes the circumstances which must obtain for the con-
cept “red” to be applied correctly (i.e., objects as being red). (P4) and (P5) premises are just 
two Peacocke’s non-conceptualist assumptions. (P6) follows from Sellars’s famous distinc-
tion presented above between representing facts of the form “s is P” and being merely ac-
quainted with particulars s and instances of properties P (Sellars 1956, 16). (P7) is just a 
consequence of assuming (P3) and (P6). Indeed, it states that being perceptually aware of 
objects and instances of redness does not amount to perceiving the circumstances speci-
fied by the application conditions of the concept “red”. For the circumstances specified by 
the application conditions of the concept “red” are precisely those where objects are red. 
Therefore, scenario contents cannot be the base on which the possession of observational 
concepts rests.
Peacocke might reply that the content of scenarios is not to be understood in terms 
of bare particulars (surfaces and property-instances) as occupying points in an egocentric 
space, but in terms of particulars as having general properties or relations in virtue of occu-
pying certain points in this space. Thus, when I perceive two different surfaces, say a and b, 
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as located one next to the other in an egocentric space—Peacoke might argue—I represent 
a as being on the left of b and b on the right of a. Similarly, when I perceive a surface and a 
color property-instance, say of RED, as occupying the same point in this space, I represent 
that surface as having the property RED. Of course—Peacocke might argue—I need not 
have the concept of either “being on the left of” or “being on the right of” to perceptually 
represent a and b as being related in such ways. Similarly, I need not have the concept “be-
ing red” in order to perceptually represent that surface as having the property RED. Placing 
such surfaces and properties in the right way is enough. Let us notice, however, that under 
this interpretation, scenarios are structured contents involving primitive forms of predica-
tion. After all, these contents not only include particulars (surfaces and property-instances) 
but also general properties as being related to these particulars predicatively—i.e., they take, 
so to speak, the predicative form “s is P”. Thus, under this interpretation, scenarios suffer 
the same fate as protopropositions.7 In what follows, I will show why protopropositions are 
a dead-end.
3.2. Protopropositions
If perceiving red stuff is a matter of representing the property RED as holding of particu-
lar objects, perception seems to provide subjects with a perceptual awareness of the circum-
stances specified by the application conditions of the concept “red”. After all, perception 
seems to provide subjects now with representational contents of the form “s is red”, which 
mirror the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept “red” (i.e., 
objects as being red). But then, we are faced with the following problem:
(P1) Entertaining contents of the form “s is red” in conceptual thinking is an abil-
ity the exercising of which rests on correctly applying the observational concept 
“red”.
(P2) Correctly applying the observational concept “red” depends, in turn, on per-
ceiving the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept 
“red”.
(P3) The circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept “red” 
are those where objects are red.
(P4) Perceiving red stuff is representing red stuff non-conceptually.
7 Against this conclusion, someone might argue that scenarios are kinds of iconic representation which 
represent the world non-propositionally (Aguilera 2016; Camp 2007; Heck 2007). According to this 
view, some representational systems are not propositional, as they do not satisfy certain constraints on 
propositional contents: full-blown generality (Evans 1982) and systematicity (Fodor 2008). Howev-
er—the argument goes—these systems manage to represent particulars as having some basic proper-
ties. My view does not go against this intuition. What I am suggesting is that any iconic representa-
tional system either represents bare particulars (objects and property-instances) or represents these 
particulars as having general properties. If the former is the case, then such systems cannot play the role 
Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of observational contents. If the latter is the 
case, then such systems involve predication—they include general properties as being related to these 
particulars predicatively—and, consequently, they mirror, functionally speaking, protopropositions. I 
thank Liz Camp for bringing this point to my attention. 
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(P5) Representing red stuff non-conceptually is, in turn, being perceptually aware of 
(representing) the property RED as holding of objects (surfaces).
(P6) Being aware of (representing) the property RED as holding of objects (surfaces) 
amounts to entertaining contents of the form “s is red”.
(P7) Therefore, perceiving red stuff is a matter of entertaining contents of the form “s 
is red”.
(C2) Entertaining contents of the form “s is red” in conceptual thinking depends on 
entertaining contents of the form “s is red” in perception.
But this poses a serious problem to Peacocke. For, when we push Peacocke’s explanation of 
the possession condition of observational concepts to the limit, we find that what is sought 
to be explained in the explanandum, say, the ability to entertain representational percep-
tual contents of the form “s is red”, is already presupposed in the explanans. In effect, (C2) 
shows that entertaining contents of the form “s is red” in conceptual thinking depends on 
entertaining contents of the form “s is red” in perception. But we can legitimately ask now: 
on which representational abilities does the ability to entertain contents of form “s is red” 
in perception rest? After all, we were told that entertaining contents of the form “s is red” 
in conceptual thinking relies on perceiving the circumstances specified by the application 
conditions of the concept “red”. And now, we are told that perceiving the circumstances 
specified by the application conditions of the concept “red” is a matter of entertaining 
those very same contents.8 This, I argue, is the core of the Myth of the Given. For the Myth 
of the Given is just the assumption that the ability to entertain contents of the form “s is P” 
in perception does not depend, unlike in cognition, on the exercise of any other represen-
tational ability—those contents are, so to speak, merely given in perception—rendering the 
explanation trivial.9 Paraphrasing Sellars’s famous inconsistent triad in Empiricism and the 
8 It is worth noting that the ability to entertain these contents in perception cannot rest on exercising 
conceptual capacities, on pain of falling into the circularity Peacocke wants to avoid. So, Peacocke has 
no option but to take this ability to be given in perception. 
9 In “Some Reflections on Language Games” (1954), Sellars advances several ideas in this direction. Ac-
cording to Sellars, any awareness of something is a move (position) in a game. As such, it is governed 
by certain rules or standards. Thus, becoming aware of concepts, propositions, relations, properties, 
etc., is making moves in a game based on what the rules of this game prescribe. That they are moves in a 
game—Sellars argues—“is indicated by the use of such terms as ‘correct’, ‘mistake’, etc., in commenting 
on them” (1954, 206). Now, Sellars points out that the view under consideration might be subject to a 
serious refutation. This is so because, insofar as making moves in a game involves obeying their rules, a 
vicious regress obtains. After all, obeying rules is also making moves in a game (1954, 204). In Sellars’s 
view, the Myth of the Given is just an illegitimate way of avoiding this regress, which basically consists 
in introducing a special kind of awareness; an awareness where one makes moves based on no other 
moves, and on which any other kind of awareness rests. The introduction of this special awareness is 
mythical or trivial since it is introduced to explain our capability to become aware of contents C, but 
it ends up having the properties it is supposed to explain: ultimately, it is an awareness of contents C 
(Sellars 1956, 73). This is especially clear in Philosophy of Language and Perception. In Philosophy of 
Language, the Myth of the Given takes the form of Sellars’s Metaphysicus Platonicus, who argues that 
(i) learning a language L is obeying the rules for their expressions, and (ii) that obeying these rules is 
not a matter of obeying meta-rules where the rules of L are expressed (a vicious regress) but a matter of 
becoming mysteriously aware of the demands and permissions prescribed by the rules of L. In percep-
tion, the Myth of the Given takes—among others— the form of Logical Empiricism’s semantic rules 
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Philosophy of Mind (1956, 21), Peacocke is confronted with the following three inconsist-
ent propositions:
A: Perceiving is entertaining contents of the form “s is P”.
B: The ability to perceive is non-conceptual (it does not involve conceptual capacities).
C: The ability to entertain contents of the form “s is P” is conceptual (it involves con-
ceptual capacities).
A and B together entail not-C; B and C entail not-A; A and C entail not-B.
Peacocke might try to overcome this objection by rejecting C. Indeed, he might insist 
that non-conceptual perceptual contents involve protopropositions that take the predica-
tive form “s is P” without bringing conceptual resources into play. Thus, the ability to en-
tertain contents of the form “s is P” in perception is not constrained by conceptual moves. 
Let us remember that protopropositions consist of individuals (particular objects) and 
properties and relations rather than concepts thereof. So, although protopropositions share 
the same structure with conceptual contents, they do so without putting concepts to work. 
Let us notice, however, that this move goes against Peacocke’s initial assumption according 
to which entertaining contents of the form “s is P” in conceptual thinking is a function of 
correctly applying the observational concept “P”. For we were initially told that entertain-
ing perceptual contents of the form “s is P” in cognition depends on perceiving the circum-
stances specified by “P”. And now we are told that perceiving the circumstances specified by 
“P” is a matter of entertaining in perception those very same contents where “P” was origi-
nally part of. Peacocke seeks to have his cake and eat it too. For, one the one hand, he wants 
protopropositions to be non-conceptual contents. But, on the other hand, he wants them 
to play the same role he had previously attributed to conceptually articulated contents. This 
tension, which is essentially the Myth of the Given, becomes more evident when we analyze 
what it is for someone to perceive protopropositional contents. Let me expand this point.
Protopropositions are non-conceptual perceptual contents that cannot be fully ana-
lyzed in terms of scenario contents. In truth, they are introduced to account for the posses-
sion conditions of observational concepts in cases where scenario contents fall short of ac-
counting for them. As Peacocke argues:
if we are to have a noncircular and individuating account of mastery of the perceptual concept 
“straight”, that mastery must be related to some feature of experience that does not have to be ex-
plained in terms that presuppose possession of the concept. We cannot supply this by relating 
the mastery to experiences whose positioned scenarios require for their correctness that a certain 
line be straight, for that can be so without the straightness being perceived. Having the property 
STRAIGHT in the protopropositional content respects that point, without threatening a circu-
lar account of mastery (Peacocke 1992, 85).
(section 8 of Sellars’s 1956), which are meant to explain the semantic connections between observa-
tional predicates (e.g. “red”) and perceptual properties (e.g., redness) through the capability to follow 
these rules. This explanation is mythical since, in order to explain the capability to become aware of 
linguistic contents of the form “this is red”, perceptual episodes of awareness of contents of the form 
“this is red” are introduced. However, such episodes of perceptual awareness are—unlike the linguis-
tic ones—taken to be given (are not based on any other move), rendering the explanation—as Sellars 
says—“a sham” (Sellars 1954, 206). 
Theoria 33/3 (2018): 401-416
 Non-conceptualism, observational concepts, and the given 413
However, when we examine protopropositional contents in details, we end up facing the 
Myth of the Given. Let us take the concept “square” as an example. We were told that per-
ceiving square surfaces is a matter of entertaining the protoproposition that the surface is 
symmetrical about the bisector of their sides. However, representing that a surface is sym-
metrical about the bisector of their sides involves entertaining a content of the form “s is P” 
which, to be sure, contains the concept of symmetry. Thus, it would seem that perceiving a 
surface as square involves the possession of the concept of symmetry. Peacocke, of course, 
does not want the capacity to perceive square surfaces to rely on any conceptual move (in-
cluding that of symmetry) (see Peacocke 1992a, 76-77). So, in order to be consistent and 
avoid circularity, Peacocke makes the following move: to perceive the protoproposition 
that the surface is symmetrical about the bisector of their sides is not a matter of entertain-
ing the propositional content “the surface is symmetrical about the bisector of their sides”, 
but just a matter of entertaining the protoporpositional content “SYMMETRY OF SIDES 
holds of the surface”. This move seems to guarantee that protopropositions be non-concep-
tual. For perceivers themselves need not have the concepts which figure in the description 
“the surface is symmetrical about the bisector of their sides” in order to perceive such a sur-
face in such a way. Perceptually focusing on such a spatial relation is enough. At this point, 
however, what makes protopropositions non-conceptual contents is what makes them un-
able to play the role Peacocke wants them to do in the possession conditions of the obser-
vational concept “square”. For, either perceiving the property SYMMETRY OF SIDES 
as holding of a surface amounts to being aware of the fact that the surface is symmetrical 
about the bisector of its sides, rendering the explanation mythical, or perceiving the prop-
erty SYMMETRY OF SIDES as holding of a surface does not amount to being aware of 
the fact that the surface is symmetrical about the bisector of its sides. But if perceiving the 
SYMMETRY OF SIDES as holding of a surface does not amount to being aware of the 
fact that the surface is symmetrical about the bisector of its sides, then perceiving the SYM-
METRY OF SIDES as holding of a particular surface does not present perceivers with the 
circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept “square”. For, the cir-
cumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept “square”—i.e., the cir-
cumstances that must obtain for the concept “square” to be applied correctly—are precisely 
those where surfaces are symmetrical about the bisector of its sides. To put it in a nutshell:
(P1) Entertaining contents of the form “that surface is square” in conceptual thinking 
is an ability the exercising of which rests on correctly applying the observational 
concept “square”.
(P2) Correctly applying the observational concept “square” depends, in turn, on per-
ceiving the circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept 
“square”.
(P3) The circumstances specified by the application conditions of the concept 
“square” are those where surfaces are symmetrical about the bisector of its sides.
(P4) Perceiving square surfaces is a matter of entertaining the content “SYMMETRY 
OF SIDES as holding of particular surfaces”.
(P5) However, entertaining the content “SYMMETRY OF SIDES as holding of par-
ticular surfaces” does not amount to being aware of the fact that the surface is 
symmetrical about the bisector of its sides—on pain of falling into the Myth of 
the Given.
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(P6) Therefore, perceiving the property SQUARE as holding of particular surfaces 
does not amount to perceiving the circumstances specified by the application 
conditions of the concept “square”.
(C3) Protopropositions cannot be the basis on which entertaining perceptual con-
tents of the form “s is P” in conceptual thinking rests.10
At this stage of the dialectic, the tension involved in Peacocke’s account of protoproposi-
tions should be clear. For, on the one hand, Peacocke wants protopropositions to play the 
same role as conceptual contents. But, on the other hand, he wants them not to be con-
ceptually articulated mental states. In effect, Peacocke wants protopropositions to be an 
awareness of facts of the form “s is P” because only this kind of awareness can guarantee 
that perceptual experiences present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the ap-
plication conditions of observational concepts. But at the same time, he does not want to 
pay the price of making such a move—namely, committing to conceptual capacities. This is 
especially clear when Peacocke tries to elucidate the non-conceptual nature of protopropo-
sitions, that is, when he is required to explain why, despite mirroring the conceptual struc-
ture, protopropositional contents are ultimately non-conceptual rather than conceptual. 
For, either he reduces protopropositions to episodes of perceptual awareness of fact of the 
form “s is P”, falling into the Myth of the Given, or he reduces protopropositions to epi-
sodes of perceptual awareness of particulars which lack the form “s is P”, rendering proto-
propositions incapable of presenting perceivers with the circumstances specified by the ap-
plication conditions of observational concepts.
To sum up, Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts 
is a dead-end. Peacocke wants protopropositions to be non-conceptual contents of the 
form “s is P” (to hold A and B). But, at the same time, he wants the ability to entertain con-
tents of the form “s is P” to be a function of conceptual moves (to hold C). So, when he is 
required to overcome this inconsistency, either he reduces protopropositional contents to 
episodes of the predicative form “s is P”, falling into the Myth of the Given, or he reduces 
protopropositions to episodes which lack the predicative form “s is P”—in other words, 
he rejects A—rendering protopropositions incapable of presenting perceivers with the cir-
cumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, conse-
quently, incapable of being the rational base on which the possession of observational con-
cepts may rest.
10 Let us remember that, since Peacocke wants to avoid circularity—i.e., requiring conceptual capacities 
to entertain protopropositions—he has no option but either to deny that entertaining protopropo-
sitions amounts to becoming aware of facts that such-and-such is the case, or to maintain that enter-
taining protopropositions amounts to becoming aware of such facts. If the former is the case, then 
protopropositions cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the 
possession conditions of observational concepts. But if the latter is the case, then protopropositions 
have the same semantic and epistemic properties that conceptual contents do, yet without requiring 
subjects to exploit conceptual capacities to entertain them. This, I have argued, is the core of the Myth 
of the Given. 
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, I argued against Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observa-
tional concepts. Firstly, I showed that if perceiving is a matter of non-conceptually repre-
senting the perceiver’s immediate environments in a spatial way (scenario contents), then 
perception does not involve an awareness of fact of the form “s is P” and, consequently, 
cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions 
of the observational concepts “P”. Secondly, I argued that if perceiving is a matter of enter-
taining protopropositions, then either protopropositions provide awareness of fact of the 
form “s is P”, rendering the explanation of the possession conditions of observational con-
cepts a myth, or do not provide awareness of facts of the form “s is P”, rendering perception 
incapable of presenting perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application con-
ditions of observational concepts.
REFERENCES
Aguilera, Mariela. 2016. Cartographic systems and non-linguistic inference. Philosophical Psychology 29/3: 
349-364.
Ayer, Alfred Julius. 1954. Basic propositions. In A. J. Ayer, ed., Philosophical essays, 105-129. London: 
M acmillan Press.
Bermúdez, José Luis. 1995. Nonconceptual content: From perceptual experience to sub-personal computa-
tional states. Mind and Language 10: 333-369.
—. 2003. Thinking without words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2007. What is at stake in the debate on non-conceptual content? Philosophical Perspectives 21: 55-72.
Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
—. 2002. The Centrality of Sellars’s two-ply account of observation to the arguments of “Empiricism and 
the philosophy of mind”. In Tales of mighty dead: Historical essays in the metaphysics of intentionality, 
348-367. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Brewer, Bill. 2005. Perceptual experience has conceptual content. In E. Sosa and M. Steup, eds., Contempo-
rary debates in epistemology, 217-230. Oxford: Blackwell.
Camp, Elisabeth. 2007. Thinking with maps. Philosophical Perspectives 21/1: 145-182.
Castellano, Federico. 2014. Intellectualism against empiricism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90: 231-251.
Davidson, Donald. 1982. Empirical content. In Subjective, intersubjective, objective, 159-175. Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
—. 1983. A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In Subjective, intersubjective, objective, 137-153. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1982. The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Fodor, Jerry. 2008. LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hanna, Robert. 2011. Beyond the myth of the myth: A Kantian theory of non-conceptual content. Interna-
tional Journal of Philosophical Studies 19/3: 323-398.
Heck, Richard. 2000. Nonconceptual content and the “Space of reasons”. The Philosophical Review 109/4: 
483-523.
—. 2007. Are there different kinds of content? In J. Cohen & B. McLaughlin, eds., Contemporary debates in 
philosophy of mind, 117-138. Oxford: Blackwell.
McDowell, Jonh. 1994. Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
—. 1998. Reply to commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58/2, 403-431.
416 Federico Castellano
Theoria 33/3 (2018): 401-416
—. 2009. Conceptual capacities in perception. In Having the world in view: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sell-
ars, 127-144. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Peacocke, Christopher. 1992a. A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
—. 1992b. Scenarios, concepts, and perception. In T. Crane, ed., The Contents of experience. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
—. 1998. Nonconceptual content defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58/2: 381-388.
—. 1999. Précis of A study of concepts. In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, eds., Concepts: Core readings, 
335-338. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
—. 2001. Does perception have a nonconceptual content? Journal of Philosophy, 98/5: 239-264.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1954. Some reflections on language games. Philosophy of Science 21: 204-228. 
—. 1956. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Robert Brandom, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997.
FEDERICO CASTELLANO is a PhD student at the National University of Córdoba. His main areas of research 
are epistemology and philosophy of mind. He is currently a doctoral fellow at the National Scientific and 
Technical Research Council (CONICET). His articles have been published in Grazer Philosophische Stu-
dien, Teorema, and Ludus Vitalis.
ADDRESS: Instituto de Humanidades (IDH), Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC), Consejo Nacional 
de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Pabellón Agustín Tosco, s/n, Ciudad Universitaria, 
5000 Córdoba (Argentina).   
Email: fedec15@gmail.com
